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Abstract 
We use data on political beliefs (broadly, left-right position, meritocracy and origins of 
poverty) to discuss Venezuela’s economic institutions. Our starting point is the large 
role attributed to beliefs in determining the economic system and the extent of 
government intervention (see, for example, Alesina et al, 2001). This brings us to the 
question of what causes changes in beliefs. We briefly discuss and present some 
evidence consistent with the idea that some of the main social and economic forces 
that affected Venezuela this century may have changed people’s rational beliefs. These 
include a dependence on oil, a history of macro-economic volatility, the rise in crime 
and the rise in a preoccupation with corruption. We end up with a cautionary result: 
although these results point in the direction of giving a role to real shocks in the 
determination of beliefs, we test and find that perceptions for different phenomena 
are sometimes correlated. In particular, the perception of corruption is related to the  
perception of crime rather than the amount of real corruption actually experienced.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In an important paper, Piketty (1995) showed how beliefs could be central to economic organization. 
He focused on beliefs concerning the income generating process and argued that when income was 
determined by luck, rational agents would be inclined to increase taxes. In contrast, when effort 
played a large role, rational agents fearing adverse incentive effects would moderate taxes. He then 
argued that, even if there was one fixed reality, two agents who started with prior beliefs at each end 
of the spectrum would not necessarily converge as long as agents could not freely find credible 
information to generalize from their own experience. In fact, he argued that information on how 
much effort really pays is not easy to observe (given that effort input is not observable), and that 
eventually agents would settle on some belief about the likely value of these parameters and stop 
experimenting (a form of bandit problem). Generalizing to countries, he argued that tax choices 
would reinforce these beliefs: where effort doesn’t pay and luck dominates, agents would tend to 
vote on high taxes and luck would then really dominate. Indeed, the key finding in Piketty’s paper is 
that two different economic systems, one with high taxes and beliefs that luck matters that can be 
called the French equilibrium and another with low taxes and a belief that effort pays that can be 
called an American equilibrium, could arise out of the same underlying reality. Other papers that 
explore related ideas concern the role of upward mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001), fairness (Alesina 
and Angeletos, 2002), belief in a just world (Benabou and Tirole, 2006) and corruption (Alesina and 
Angeletos, 2004 and Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002). North and Denzau (1993) discuss institutions 
as “shared mental models” (see also Greif, 1994). 
 
A belief-based explanation is attractive given the difficulties that the standard economic model (e.g., 
Meltzer and Richards, 1981) has in explaining the observed patterns of inequality and redistribution 
across Europe and the US. Indeed, these models are particularly relevant once one observes the 
remarkable differences in beliefs across the Atlantic. For instance, Alesina et al (2001) report that 
60% of Americans - yet only 26% of Europeans - believe the poor are lazy, while spending on social 
welfare in 1995 in the US was 16% of GDP compared to an average of 25% for countries in Europe. 
See also Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and the evidence in Hochschild (1981), Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2005), Fong (2004) and Ladd and Bowman (1998) inter alia. 
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Given the centrality of beliefs in economic organization, it seems natural to ask what drives beliefs. 
Very little evidence (that has a causal interpretation) is available (but see Di Tella, Donna and 
MacCulloch, 2006, on the connection with crime; and Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrdosky, 2004, on 
the connection with property rights and a windfall gain). One extreme position is to argue that 
beliefs are cultural norms and are thus immutable. Alternatively, a rational learning process would 
posit their dependence on economic conditions. The latter hypothesis is particularly interesting in the 
context of Latin America, in general, and Venezuela, in particular, given their rather eventful history, 
with several traumatic and joyous events that may have affected beliefs simply because reality, at least 
for a while, appeared to have changed. The oil discoveries and the high prices during the 1970’s, the 
macroeconomic crises and the crime waves are all candidate episodes to be explored.  
 
In this paper, we take some of the likely forces that may have affected the formation of beliefs in 
Venezuela, explore their validity using data from a broader sample of countries, and then use the 
results to see how much of the Venezuelan experience they can explain. In particular, we wish to 
explain why the economy did so well between 1920 and 1970 yet so poorly after 1970 when the 
economies of other Latin American countries were growing. Our explanation centers on the 
increased macroeconomic volatility caused by the oil price shocks in the 1970s that led to a shift 
toward more leftist economic beliefs. In particular Venezuelans began to view luck as the 
predominant determinant of economic success rather than effort. In this sense the curse of 
Venezuela’s ‘‘resource curse’’ may have been a tendency for people to become more left wing as 
volatile oil prices ushered in an era of populist and interventionist government policies that 
hampered the nation’s post 1970s economic development.  
 
In section II we discuss the role of a history of macroeconomic volatility, in section III we explore 
the role of a country’s dependence on oil rents; in section IV we present further results on the role of 
corruption and beliefs (along the lines discussed in Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002), while section V 
presents the correlations between beliefs and having been the victim of crime. Section VI studies the 
correlation between beliefs about a phenomenon (corruption) and the beliefs about a second 
phenomenon (crime) controlling for reality (i.e., the experience with corruption and the experience 
with crime). Section VII discusses the results in the context of Venezuela while section VIII offers 
some concluding comments.  
 
 4 
 
II. Beliefs and a History of Macro Volatility 
 
In this section we study the correlation between a country’s historical macroeconomic performance 
and their average beliefs in a cross-section of countries. We use the average values obtained from the 
3rd wave of the World Values Survey to construct our measures of beliefs and the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators to construct our measures of macro volatility. The basic results are 
presented in Tables 1A-B. All regressions are estimated using OLS for simplicity (similar results are 
obtained if ordered logits are estimated) and control for income (6 categories), gender and age.1 
Results in columns (1-4) in Table 1A focus on a general measure of beliefs: ideological self-
placement on a 0-10 scale. These regressions are illustrative as a first broad pass at the data as clearly 
the answers are provided with some country-specific ideological content. It is still perhaps interesting 
to note that a history of inflation volatility tilts the survey answers significantly to the left. In order to 
get some sense of the size of the effect, note that a one standard deviation of the History of Inflation 
Volatility variable is associated with a decline of Right Wing-R of 5.8% of a standard deviation of this 
variable (-0.058=(329.1/2.33)*(-4.1e-04)). Columns (2-4) in Table 1A presents similar regressions, 
using History of GDP Growth Volatility, History of Exchange Rate Volatility and History of Unemployment. 
The results are consistent (the coefficients are negative) although they are less precisely estimated. 
 
Regressions (5-8) in Table 1A focus on a more interesting dimension of beliefs, namely Unfair for 
Poor-L, a dummy equal to 1 if the response to the question: “Why, in your opinion, are there people in this 
country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which comes closest to your view? (1) They are poor because of 
laziness and lack of willpower, or (2) They are poor because society treats them unfairly” is (2) and 0 if the answer 
is (1). Now the key coefficients are generally positive as expected (the variable is defined so that 
bigger numbers have a natural interpretation as being left) and significant for both a history of 
inflation volatility and a history of exchange rate volatility. A history of unemployment volatility is 
also positive, but only significant at the 15% level.  
 
                                       
1 The controls are chosen to keep constant some basic set of personal characteristics of the respondents that may affect 
beliefs (although these are country averages, so their influence in this particular case is marginal) without sacrificing 
sample size.  
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Columns (1-4) in Table 1B focus on the variable No Escape-L (all variable definitions are in the 
Appendix) and reveal that the volatility of inflation and of the exchange rate, as well as the history of 
unemployment, are correlated with more left-wing beliefs as expected. Columns (5-8) focus on 
Business Owner-L. Columns (5-6) are positive and significant, while column (7) is positive but only 
significant at the 11% level. 
 
 
 
 
III. Beliefs and Oil 
 
We now explore the hypothesis that economic dependence on oil causes the average beliefs in the 
country to lean towards the left-end of the political spectrum. The results are presented in Table 2, 
where we now focus on one summary variable of beliefs (ideological self-placement on a 1-10 scale) 
and regress the average country-year values against several measures of dependence on oil. One 
improvement over the previous section is that, given that we are no longer interested in historical 
background, we can exploit the time dimension of the values data and present panel regressions that 
control for country and year fixed effects. We adopt the convention that data from the WVS for 
wave 1 is matched to World Development Indicators data from 1981, for wave 2 to 1990 and wave 3 
to 1997. All regressions control for age, gender and income of the respondents, although given 
representative sampling within countries this should not have a large influence in our results.2 All 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level. 
 
Column (1) reports a negative coefficient, significant at the 13% level, indicating a tendency to move 
left when fuel exports (as a percentage of merchandise exports) increase. Column (2) uses logs and 
reports a somewhat larger and considerably more precise coefficient on the dependence on oil (it is 
significant at the 1% level). In terms of size, a one standard deviation of Log Fuel Exports is associated 
with a decline equal to 4.6% of a standard deviation in (right-wing) beliefs.  
 
                                       
2 When we add gender as personal control in the regressions of Table 2A, Mexico’s observations for the first wave are 
lost. This might be significant as Mexico is a gross outlier, with the largest reduction in dependence on fuel exports, all 
concentrated in the first two waves, and the largest decline in Right Wing inclinations. 
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The rest of the table switches to other measures of income’s dependence on luck in the country. 
Column (3) focuses on ores and metal exports as a percentage of merchandise exports. The 
coefficient is negative but insignificant. Column (4) uses logs, and finds a negative coefficient 
significant at the 8% level. In terms of size, a one standard deviation of Log Ores Exports is associated 
with a decline equal to 3.5% of a standard deviation in beliefs. Columns (5-6) present weaker results 
(but still with the expected sign) using Manufacturing Exports and its log. 
 
 
 
IV. Beliefs and Corruption 
 
In Table 3 we explore the relationship between ideological inclination and corruption. When 
corruption is widespread, the legitimacy of profits and business is called into question and individuals 
will be attracted to left-wing ideas, particularly in the economic sphere (see Di Tella and MacCulloch, 
2002, 2006). It uses a corruption variable as coded by experts working for Political Risk Services, a 
private international investment risk service. Introduced into economics by Knack and Keefer 
(1995), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index has been produced annually 
since 1982 and intends to capture the extent to which “high government officials are likely to 
demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of 
government” in the form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, 
tax assessments, police protection, or loans”. 
 
Column (1) in Table 3 correlates the average ideological inclination in the country with the perceived 
corruption level, controlling for country and year effects. The coefficient is negative as expected and 
significant at the 3% level. In terms of size, we note that a one standard deviation (within) in the 
ICRG corruption indicator is associated with a decline in a country’s ideological inclination, Right 
Wing-R, equal to 3.7% of a standard deviation (within) of the ideological variable (-0.037=0.42*(-
0.19)/2.15). Column (2) shows that the same correlation using logs is weaker as it is only statistically 
significant at the 10.5% level. 
 
 
 
V. Beliefs and Crime 
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In Table 4 we study the connection between crime and beliefs following Di Tella et al (2006). Such a 
connection might be expected when, for example, agents have incomplete information about the role 
of effort in the income generating process and the observation of crime informs agents about other 
people’s view of how much it pays to work hard (which is probably low, given that they have chosen 
crime). Indeed, the two equilibria in the Piketty (1995) model survive only as long as agents cannot 
observe how much effort others are putting in (and how much income they obtain). This requires 
that agents cannot reconstruct other people’s information set from their choices in the labor market 
or in the political market which is a somewhat artificial assumption given that vote outcomes are 
well-known and also career choices (for example, criminal or not). In order to test this hypothesis we 
need data on people’s beliefs and on their view of how much crime there is (or on their experience as 
victims of crime).  
 
Such data can be found in the Latino-barometer, an annual public opinion survey of approximately 
19,000 interviews in 18 countries in Latin America. Questions of interest rotate, so the number of 
waves (and thus our sample size) varies considerably depending on the question being studied. It is 
produced by Latinobarómetro Corporation, a non profit NGO based in Santiago, Chile. It has data 
on a number of attitudinal variables that are associated with ideological standing (on an economic 
dimension). From the long list we choose two that are suitable for our purposes. One concerns the 
fairness of the distribution of income and the other concerns how successful were privatizations. 
The exact data is Fair-L (Now I'd like you some questions about the problem of poverty, in this 
country and in other countries: How fair do you think the distribution of income is in this country? 
The four possible answers are 1. Very fair; 2. Fair; 3. Unfair; and 4. Very unfair) and Privatiz-L (Do 
you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Privatization of public companies has been 
beneficial to the country? The two possible answers are 1. I agree; and 2. I disagree). 
 
In columns (1-2) of Table 4 we correlate these beliefs question with Perception of crime, the answer to 
the question  “Crime has increased or decreased?”. The possible answers are coded such that it takes 
the value 0 if the answer is “Has increased a lot” and 1 if it is “Has increased a little”, “Has stayed 
the same”, “Has fallen a little” or “Has fallen a lot”. We collapse the answers into two because, 
although there are four categorical answers to this question, the overwhelming majority chooses one 
option. The raw data show that 96,358 individuals selected the answer “crime has increased a lot 
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over the past year”, while 14,610 say “it has increased somewhat”, 8,591 say it has stayed the same, 
2,904 say it has dropped somewhat and 439 say it has dropped a lot. We repeated the analysis using 
the four categories and all the results remain qualitatively similar. Both coefficients are negative as 
expected and significant. Note that this is unlikely to reflect a fixed trait of the respondents because 
such a fixed characteristic is most likely ideological orientation: right wing individuals are always 
complaining that crime is a terrible thing and also tend to think that the distribution of income is fair. 
In this case the connection goes the opposite way so, at least in this regard, it is an underestimate of 
the true effect. We also include a set of control variables that help ameliorate this concern, including 
age, gender income as well as year and country fixed effects.  
 
Columns (3-4) move to Real Crime as independent variable, namely whether the respondent (or a 
relative of the respondent) was a victim of crime over the previous year. Again, both coefficients are 
negative and comfortably significant. Now the potential confounding effect is not an ideological 
fixed effect but rather some omitted variable such as income, which determines that you are both the 
victim of crime and that you hold left wing views. Columns (5-6) repeat the exercise with a broader 
set of controls. These include age, gender, dummies for city size and all the previous explanatory 
variables but using a new measure of each respondent’s income. A person’s declared income level is 
now captured by the question: “The wage or salary you receive and the total family income, Does it 
allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? In which of these situations are you?” The possible 
answers are: “It is good enough, you can save”, “It is just enough, without great difficulties”, “It is 
not enough, you have difficulties” and “It is not enough, you have great difficulties”.  The results are 
again supportive of the hypothesis that an experience with crime moved individuals to the left-end of 
the political spectrum. In auxiliary regressions we included controls for educational attainment, a 
person’s ideological self-placement and simultaneous controls for both measures of income and 
obtained similar results. 
 
 
VI. Perceptions versus Reality 
 
Having established that perceptions of corruption and crime affect ideological inclination, it is 
interesting to explore what drives these perceptions. Is it reality, so that people’s perception of 
corruption follows the fact that there is more corruption? Or is it that these perceptions are like 
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“moods” that can get divorced from reality? In a recent paper, Olken (2006) shows that there can be 
a substantial divorce between reality and perceptions using Indonesian data.  
 
One possible strategy is to evaluate if the perception of a certain phenomenon is related strongly to 
the experience of that phenomenon or the perception of a (presumably unrelated) phenomenon. In 
Table 5 we present regressions for Perception of Corruption on Real Corruption. The coefficient is positive 
and significant, suggesting that reality does affect perceptions. Regression (2) includes year fixed 
effects and the coefficient remains unaffected. Regression (3) shows that when we include the 
perception and reality of a second phenomenon, crime, the coefficient on Real Corruption is almost 
halved and is now statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the coefficient on Perception of Crime is 
positive and statistically well-defined (while Real Crime is uncorrelated with Perception of Corruption). 
Real Crime is included as a reassurance that actual crime is being kept constant (although its inclusion 
does not affect the conclusions). The size of the coefficient is extremely large, suggesting that the 
role of perceptions (generally) is important, potentially overwhelming the impact of reality. To get a 
sense of the relative size, note that a one standard deviation increase in Real Corruption is associated 
with an increase in Perceived Corruption equal  to less than 1% of a standard deviation in that variable 
(0.009=(0.43/0.68)*0.015). In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in Perception of Crime is 
associated with an increase in Perception of Corruption equal to 53% of a standard deviation 
(0.53=(0.74/0.68)*0.49). Real Crime has virtually no effect (just over 1.4% in standardized units).  
 
Regressions (5-6) repeat the exercise for Venezuela and reveal that the same phenomenon applies 
there. This suggests that perceptions of corruption (and of other “bads”) are driven not by reality, 
but rather by some other force. We conjecture that this makes the electorate particularly receptive to 
“political activists” who supply beliefs, as in Glaeser’s (1995) model of hatred.  
 
 
VII. The Case of Venezuela 
 
We can apply the above results to the case of Venezuela. We first focus on the role of volatility of 
the economy. High levels of volatility may mean that the connection between effort and reward is 
lost. This may in turn affect people’s (right-left) beliefs about the degree of regulation and taxation 
that is required for their society. Venezuela lies in the top quarter of the countries in our sample in 
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terms of both inflation and unemployment volatility. An increase in inflation (unemployment) 
volatility from US to Venezuelan levels explains 6.9% (24.8%) of the difference in leftist beliefs 
about the degree to which the poor have been treated unfairly and 4.3% (21.0%) of the difference in 
leftist beliefs about the chances of escaping from poverty between these two nations (see Tables 1A 
and 1B). 
 
Another striking feature of Venezuela is its’ unusually high dependence on natural resources, in 
particular oil. To the extent that this country relies on abundant natural resources, becoming wealthy 
may be more associated with success in capturing rents and belonging to the elite, rather than on 
working hard in competitive industries. Venezuela has the second highest level of fuel exports as a 
proportion of total merchandise exports across all the countries in our sample (at 78.9%). The 
highest proportion is Nigeria (see Figure 1). A high dependence on oil may also be one of the causes 
of the increased unemployment and inflation volatility discussed above (see, inter alia, Carruth, 
Hooker and Oswald, 1998). An increase in fuels as a proportion of total merchandise exports from 
US to Venezuelan levels is predicted to push an individual toward having more leftist beliefs by 1.1 
units on the 0-10 right-left scale (see Table 2). 
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Figure 1: Ordered Ranking of Fuels Exports as a Proportion of Total Merchandise Exports for Sample 
 
 
Turning to corruption, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index places Venezuela in the 
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bottom 13% of nations in our sample. An increase in the corruption index from US to Venezuelan 
levels is predicted to push an individual toward having more leftist beliefs by 0.24 units on the 0-10 
right-left scale (see Table 3). We also noted earlier how higher observed crime rates may lead people 
to believe that effort exerted in legal labour market activities is not rewarding thereby affecting their 
political beliefs. An increase from the lowest to the highest average measures of Perception of Crime 
recorded between 1995 and 2001 within Venezuela explains 15.4% of the range of leftist values as 
measured by ‘fairness of the distribution of income’ (see Table 4).  
 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
 
The starting point of this paper is the fact that the Venezuelan public has become more receptive to 
left wing, populist, anti-market rhetoric. This paper explores why. Our main explanation centers on 
the increased macroeconomic volatility stemming from the oil price shocks in the 1970s that led 
Venezuelans to view luck (rather than effort) as the reason behind economic success. Their heavy 
dependence on oil meant that internationally determined prices became an important driver of the 
economy and led to a shift toward more leftist economic beliefs that favored the view that the poor 
were not to blame for their predicament and should be helped by the government. In other words, 
the curse of Venezuela’s ‘‘resource curse’’ may have been a tendency for the people to become more 
left wing as volatile oil prices in the 1970s ushered in an era of populist and interventionist policies 
that hampered the nation’s post 1970s economic development.  
 
More specifically, we use anecdotal evidence to focus on four phenomena that appear to be 
widespread in Venezuela: a history of macro-volatility, an economic dependency on oil, a belief that 
corruption is widespread and the belief that there has been a crime wave in the country. These four 
phenomena are theoretically compatible with moving the electorate to the left, because macro-
volatility and oil dependency mean that luck is important relative to effort in the determination of 
income, because corruption erodes the legitimacy of business (see for example Di Tella and 
MacCulloch, 2002) and because widespread crime gives us information about how badly other 
people (criminals) fared in the labor market. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 
beliefs are correlated with these forces.  
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Although these points broadly in the direction of realty being an important factor in the formation of 
beliefs for some of the factors study (e.g., our data on oil dependency is from actual oil dependency), 
the data on corruption used on Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) is based on the perception of 
corruption. Perceptions may sometimes be divorced  from reality, as political players (like Hugo 
Chavez) can potentially affect the beliefs of the electorate (perhaps by attacking a political group for 
political gain). In an attempt to shed some light on the relative perception of reality, we run 
regressions of the perception of corruption on reality (personal experience with corruption) and on 
the perceptions of another phenomenon (the perceptions of how much has crime increased), 
controlling for reality. We note that the perceptions of corruption are strongly correlated with the 
perceptions of this second phenomenon (the increase in crime) and have a much weaker connection 
with the personal experience with corruption or crime (reality). 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
 
Table 1A 
How Beliefs (General Ideology and ‘Poor are Lazy’) vary with Macro Volatility: 
Cross Section, 32 countries 
 
 
Dependent  var iab les :  
 
(1) 
Right 
Wing-R 
(2) 
Right 
Wing-R 
(3) 
Right 
Wing-R 
(4) 
Right 
Wing-R 
(5) 
Unfair for 
Poor-L 
(6)  
Unfair for 
Poor-L 
(7) 
Unfair for 
Poor-L 
(8) 
Unfair for 
Poor-L 
         
History of Inflation 
Volatility 
-4.1e-04 
(1.3e-04)    
1.5e-04 
(3.9e-05)    
         
History of GDP growth 
Volatility  
-0.018 
(0.034)    
-0.006 
(0.015)   
         
History of Exchange Rate 
Volatility   
-0.033 
(0.027)    
0.019 
(0.007)  
         
History of Unemployment    -0.017 (0.022)    
0.008 
(0.005) 
R-sq 0.013 0.010 0.003 0.011 0.018 1e-04 0.011 0.010 
Number of Groups 32 32 32 32 31 31 31 31 
Number of Obs. 31,585 31,585 31,585 31,585 27,120 27,120 27,120 27,120 
 
Notes:  
 
[1] Name of dependent variable has L (R) extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right).  
Right Wing-R: A categorical variable that is the answer to the question: “In politics people talk of the “left” and of the 
“right”. In a scale where “0” is left and “10” is right, where would you place yourself?”.  
Unfair for Poor-L: A dummy that is the response to the question: “Why, in your opinion, are there people in this country 
who live in need? Here are two opinions: which comes closest to your view?  (1) They are poor because of laziness and 
lack of willpower, or (2) They are poor because society treats them unfairly.” The dummy takes the value 1 if the answer 
is (2) and 0 if the answer is (1). 
[2] All regressions are cross-section (3rd wave) OLS regressions. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering) are in 
parentheses. The regressions include a set of personal controls which include age, gender and Income Ia (which is the 
respondents declared income level as captured in the answer to the question: “People sometimes describe themselves as 
belonging to the lower class, the middle class, or the upper. How would you describe yourself?”. 
[3] Right hand side variables are constructed using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators as follows:  
History of Inflation Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the inflation (CPI) 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3rd wave of 
the WVS) using annual averages in %.  
History of Growth Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the GDP growth 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3rd wave of 
the WVS) using annual averages in %.  
History of Exchange Rate Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the Exchange Rate growth 1993-1997 (5 years before 
the 3rd wave of the WVS) calculated using the official exchange rate (LCU per US$, annual average) 
History of Unemployment: Average of the absolute value of the Unemployment rate 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3rd wave 
of the WVS) using annual averages (% of total labor force). 
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Table 1B 
How Beliefs (‘Escape from Poverty’ and ‘Ownership of Business’) vary with  
Macro Volatility:  Cross Section, 32 countries  
 
 
Dependent  var iab les :  
 
(1) 
No 
Escape–L 
(2) 
No 
Escape–L 
(3) 
No 
Escape–L 
(4) 
No 
Escape–L 
(5) 
Business 
Owner-L 
(6) 
Business 
Owner-L 
(7) 
Business 
Owner-L 
(8) 
Business 
Owner-L 
         
History of Inflation 
Volatility 
2.2e-04 
(5.3e-05)    
2.0e-04 
(4.4e-05)    
         
History of GDP growth 
Volatility  
-0.009 
(0.022)    
0.036 
(0.005)   
         
History of Exchange Rate 
Volatility   
0.029 
(0.010)    
0.024 
(0.015)  
         
History of Unemployment    0.016 (0.008)    
-8.2e-04 
(0.005) 
         
R-sq 0.024 0.007 0.015 0.023 0.032 0.057 0.014 0.007 
Number of Groups 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Number of Obs. 32,266 32,266 32,266 32,266 29,566 29,566 29,566 29,566 
 
Notes:  
 
[1] Name of dependent variable has L (R) extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right).  
No Escape–L: A dummy equal to 1 if the answer to the question: “In your opinion, do most poor people in this country 
have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there is very little chance of escaping?  (1) They have a chance or (2) There is 
very little chance.” was category (2) and 0 if it was category (1). 
Business Ownership-L: The response to the World Values question: “There is a lot of discussion about how business and 
industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners should run 
their business or appoint the managers, (2) The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of 
managers, (3) The government should be the owner and appoint the managers, (4) The employees should own the 
business and elect the managers”. Business Ownership-L was defined as a dummy equals 1 if the answer is category (3) or 
(4) and 0 if the answer is category (1) or (2). 
[2] All regressions are cross-section (3rd wave) OLS regressions. Standard errors (adjusted for clustering) are in 
parentheses. The regressions include a set of personal controls which include age, gender and Income Ia (which is the 
respondents declared income level as captured in the answer to the question: “People sometimes describe themselves as 
belonging to the lower class, the middle class, or the upper. How would you describe yourself?”.  
[3] Right hand side variables are constructed using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators as follows:  
History of Inflation Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the inflation (CPI) 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3rd wave of 
the WVS) using annual averages in %.  
History of Growth Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the GDP growth 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3rd wave of 
the WVS) using annual averages in %.  
History of Exchange Rate Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the Exchange Rate growth 1993-1997 (5 years before 
the 3rd wave of the WVS) calculated using the official exchange rate (LCU per US$, annual average) 
History of Unemployment: Average of the absolute value of the Unemployment rate 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3rd wave 
of the WVS) using annual averages (% of total labor force) 
 
 15 
 
Table 2 
Left Wing Beliefs and Dependence on Oil Rents: Panel Regressions 
 
Dependent  Variab le :  
Right Wing-R (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fuel Exports -0.010 (0.006)      
       
Log Fuel Exports  -0.323 (0.092)     
       
Ores Exports   -0.065 (0.026)    
       
Log Ores Exports    -0.466 (0.256)   
       
Manufacturing Exports     0.006 (0.004)  
       
Log Manufacturing Exports      0.211 (0.204) 
       
Adj R-sq 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.060 0.060 
Between Number of Groups 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Max Number of Groups 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Number of Obs. 79,251 79,251 79,251 79,251 79,251 79,251 
 
Notes: 
 
[1] All regressions are OLS regressions and include country and year dummies. [2] Dependent variable is Right Wing,-R a 
categorical variable that is the answer to the question: “In politics people talk of the “left” and of the “right”. In a scale 
where “0” is left and “10” is right, where would you place yourself?” and is obtained from the WVS. [3] Fuel Exports 
refers to ‘Fuel exports as % of merchandise exports’ and is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. [4] Ores Exports refers to ‘Ores and metals exports as % of merchandise exports’ and is obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. [5] Manufacturing Exports refers to “Manufactures exports as % of 
merchandise exports” and is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. [6] Merchandise Exports 
show the f.o.b. value of goods provided to the rest of the world valued in U.S. dollars. They are classified using the 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). In particular, the World Bank figures distinguish between 
‘Merchandise Exports’ and “Exports of Services”. [7] Log Variable Name refers to the natural log of Variable Name. [8] All 
regressions control for age, gender and Income Ia. [9] Income Ia: The respondents declared income level as capture in the 
question “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the lower class, the middle class, or the upper. How 
would you describe yourself?” [10] Standard errors on Fuel Exports, Log Fuel Exports, Ores Exports, Log Ores Exports, 
Manufacturing Exports and Log Manufacturing Exports adjusted to take account of clustering within countries. [11] Clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
How Left Wing Beliefs vary with Corruption: Panel Regressions 
 
Dependent  Variab le :  Right Wing-R 
 
(1) (2) 
Corruption -0.190 (0.086)  
   
Log Corruption  -0.262 (0.157) 
   
Adj R-sq 0.067 0.061 
Between Number of Groups 25 25 
Max Number of Groups 36 36 
Number of Obs. 66,144 66,144 
 
Notes:  
 
[1] All regressions are OLS regressions and include country and year dummies. [2] 
Dependent variable is Right Wing-R, a categorical variable that is the answer to the 
question: “In politics people talk of the “left” and of the “right”. In a scale where “0” is 
left and “10” is right, where would you place yourself?” and is obtained from the WVS. 
[3] Corruption is obtained the ICRG. See Knack and Keefer (1995). [7] Log Corruption 
refers to the natural log of Corruption. [8] All regressions control for age, gender and 
Income Ia. [9] Income Ia: The respondents declared income level as captured by the 
question “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the 
middle class, or the upper or lower class. How would you describe yourself?” [10] 
Standard errors on Corruption and Log Corruption adjusted to take account of clustering 
within countries. [11] Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4 
How Left Wing Beliefs vary with Crime: Panel Regressions 
 
Dependent  Variab le s :  
LATIN AMERICA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fair-L Privatiz-L Fair-L Privatiz-L Fair-L Privatiz-L Fair-L Privatiz-L 
         
Perception of Crime -0.283 -0.051   -0.237 -0.050   
 (0.012) (0.005)   (0.014) (0.005)   
         
Real Crime   -0.031 -0.011   -0.022 -0.010 
   (0.009) (0.004)   (0.011) (0.004) 
         
Personal Controls I Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Personal Controls II No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Pseudo Rsq 0.082 0.045 0.072 0.044 0.105 0.045 0.099 0.042 
Max No. of Groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Between No. Groups 17 17 17 17 15 17 15 17 
No of Observations 47,283 53,107 47,231 68,738 35,267 51,827 35,181 66,323 
 
Notes:  
 
[1] Name of dependent variable has L (R) extension if higher numbers mean more Left (Right). [2] All regressions are 
OLS regressions and include country and year dummies. [3] All variables are obtained from the Latinobarómetro. [4] 
Standard errors in parentheses. [5] Perception of Crime is a dummy that equals 0 if the answer to the question “Crime has 
increased or decreased?” is “Has increased a lot” and 1 if it is “Has increased a little”, “Has stayed the same”, “Has fallen 
a little” or “Has fallen a lot”. [6] Real Crime is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the answer to the question: “Have you or 
a relative of yours been a victim of an assault, an aggression, or a crime, in the last 12 months?” is “Yes”, and 2 if the 
answer is “No”. [7] Personal Controls I: age, gender and Income Ib. Personal Controls II: age, gender, Income Ib, and City 
Size. [8] Income Ib: The respondents declared income level as capture in the question “The wage or salary you receive and 
the total family income, Does it allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? In which of these situations are you?” The 
possible answers are “It is good enough, you can save”, “It is just enough, without great difficulties”, “It is not enough, 
you have difficulties” and “It is not enough, you have great difficulties”. [9] City Size: The size of the city where the 
interview takes place. The 2 possible categories are 1 if “100,000 or less” and 2 if “capital or more than 100,000”. [10] 
Dependent variables are the answers to the questions:  
 
Columns (1,3,5,7) Fair-L: Now I'd like you some questions about the problem of poverty, in this country and in 
other countries: How fair do you think the distribution of income is in this country? The five 
possible answers are 1. Very fair; 2. Fair; 3. Neither Fair nor unfair; 4. Unfair; and 5. Very 
unfair. 
 
Columns (2,4,6,8)  Privatiz-L: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
The Privatization of public companies has been beneficial to the country. The two possible 
values are 1. I agree (if the answer to the question is: I completely agree or I agree); and 2. I 
disagree (if the answer to the question is: I completely disagree or I disagree). 
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Table 5 
How Perceptions of Corruption vary with Real Corruption,                                              
Perception of Crime and Real crime: Panel Regressions 
 
Dependent  Variab le : LATIN AMERICA VENEZUELA 
Perception of Corruption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Real Corruption 0.028 (0.012) 
0.028 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.069 
(0.064) 
0.068 
(0.059) 
       
Perception of Crime   0.490 (0.007) 
0.490 
(0.007)  
0.660 
(0.044) 
       
Real Crime   0.011 (0.010) 
0.011 
(0.010)  
-0.028 
(0.054) 
       
Year dummy NO YES NO YES Year: 2001 Year: 2001 
R2 overall 0.009 0.010 0.217 0.220 0.036 0.211 
No. of Groups 17 17 17 17   
Obs 17,564 17,564 17,564 17,564 1,037 1,037 
 
Notes:  
[1] All regressions are OLS regressions. [2] Dependent variable is Perception of Corruption a categorical 
variable equal 1 if the answer to the question “Corruption has increased or decreased?” is “Has increased a 
lot”, 2 if it is “Has increased a little”, 3 if it is “Has stayed the same”, 4 if it is “Has fallen a little” and 5 if it 
is “Has fallen a lot”. [3] Real Corruption is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the answer to the question: 
“Have you or a relative of yours been a victim of corruption, in the last 12 months?” is “Yes”, and 2 if the 
answer is “No”. [4] Perception of Crime, a categorical variable equal 1 if the answer to the question “Crime 
has increased or decreased?” is “Has increased a lot”, 2 if it is “Has increased a little”, 3 if it is “Has stayed 
the same”, 4 if it is “Has fallen a little” and 5 if it is “Has fallen a lot”. [5] Real Crime is a categorical variable 
equal to 1 if the answer to the question: “Have you or a relative of yours been a victim of an assault, an 
aggression, or a crime, in the last 12 months?” is “Yes”, and 2 if the answer is “No”. [6] All regressions 
control for: age, gender, Income Ib and Right Wing-R. [7] Income Ib: The respondents declared income level as 
capture in the question “The wage or salary you receive and the total family income, Does it allow you to 
satisfactorily cover your needs? In which of these situations are you?” The possible answers are “It is good 
enough, you can save”, “It is just enough, without great difficulties”, “It is not enough, you have 
difficulties” and “It is not enough, you have great difficulties”.[8] Right Wing-R, is the answer to the World 
Values question: “In politics people talk of the “left” and of the “right”. In a scale where “0” is left and 
“10” is right, where would you place yourself?”. [9] Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 6 
Summary Statistics for the Aggregate Variables 
(Latinobarómetro, WVS, World Bank).  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Table 
Right Wing-R 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 31,585 
n=32 
T-bar= 987.031 
 
 
5.71 2.33 
0.68 
2.26 
1 
4.77 
-0.33 
10 
7.93 
10.94 
1A 
Unfair for Poor–L 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 27,120 
n=31 
T-bar= 874.839 
 
 
0.71 0.45 
0.13 
0.43 
0 
0.40 
-0.15 
1 
0.86 
1.31 
1A 
No Escape–L 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 32,266 
n=32 
T-bar= 1008.31 
 
 
0.59 0.49 
0.19 
0.45 
0 
0.12 
-0.27 
1 
0.86 
1.47 
1B 
Business Owner.-L 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 29,566 
n=32 
T-bar= 923.938 
 
 
0.23 0.42 
0.14 
0.40 
0 
0.4 
-0.34 
1 
0.57 
1.19 
1B 
History of Inflation Volatility 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 31,585 
n=32 
T-bar= 987.031 
 
 
169.30 329.10 
306.20 
0 
0.80 
0.80 
1219.82 
1219.82 
1219.82 
169.30 
1A 
History of GDP growth Volatility 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 31,585 
n=32 
T-bar= 987.031 
 
 
4.88 2.31 
2.30 
0 
0.82 
0.82 
4.88 
12.47 
12.47 
4.88 
1A 
History of Exchange Rate Volatility 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 31,585 
n=32 
T-bar= 987.031 
 
 
0.81 1.79 
1.72 
0 
1.9e-03 
1.9e-03 
0.81 
7.62 
7.62 
0.81 
1A 
History of Unemployment 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 31,585 
n=32 
T-bar= 987.031 
 
 
7.91 4.30 
4.97 
0 
0.50 
0.50 
7.91 
22.32 
22.32 
7.91 
1A 
… continued next page 
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continued from previous page… 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Table 
Right Wing-R 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 79,251 
n=49 
T-bar= 1,617.37 
 
 
5.56 2.21 
0.62 
2.14 
1 
4.26 
-0.47 
10 
7.93 
11.30 
2A 
Fuel Exports 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 79,251 
n=49 
T-bar= 1,617.37 
 
 
12.65 20.50 
20.63 
2.79 
0.01 
0.01 
-1.81 
96.28 
96.28 
25.73 
2A 
Log Fuel Exports 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 79,251 
n=49 
T-bar= 1,617.37 
 
 
1.35 1.78 
2.03 
0.31 
-5.11 
-5.11 
0.60 
4.57 
4.57 
2.15 
2A 
Ores Exports 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 79,251 
n=49 
T-bar= 1,617.37 
 
 
6.33 9.50 
9.70 
0.91 
0.01 
0.01 
2.26 
54.61 
52.15 
8.78 
2A 
Log Ores Exports 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 79,251 
n=49 
T-bar= 1,617.37 
 
 
1.12 1.41 
1.51 
0.16 
-4.22 
-4.22 
0.55 
4.00 
3.95 
1.65 
2A 
Manufacturing Exports 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 79,251 
n=49 
T-bar= 1,617.37 
 
 
59.72 24.72 
26.09 
4.18 
3.36 
3.36 
41.99 
95.89 
95.35 
79.33 
2A 
Log Manufacturing Exports 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 79,251 
n=49 
T-bar= 1,617.37 
 
 
3.93 0.68 
0.74 
0.08 
1.21 
1.21 
3.45 
4.56 
4.56 
4.26 
2A 
Right Wing-R 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 66,144 
n=36 
T-bar= 1,837.33 
 
 
5.61 2.21 
0.64 
2.15 
1 
4.58 
-0.43 
10 
7.93 
11.02 
3 
Corruption 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 66,144 
n=36 
T-bar= 1,837.33 
 
 
2.46 1.38 
1.36 
0.42 
1 
1 
1.20 
5 
5 
3.78 
3 
Log Corruption 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 66,144 
n=36 
T-bar= 1,837.33 
 
 
0.73 0.60 
0.58 
0.23 
0 
0 
0.01 
1.61 
1.61 
1.11 
3 
… continued next page 
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continued from previous page… 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Table 
Fair-L 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 47,283 
n=17 
T-bar= 2,781.35 
 
 
4.00 1.03 
0.19 
1.00 
1 
3.64 
0.65 
5 
4.35 
5.36 
4 
Privatiz-L 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 53,107 
n=17 
T-bar= 3,123.94 
 
 
1.65 0.48 
0.08 
0.47 
1 
1.44 
0.88 
2 
1.77 
2.22 
4 
Perception of Crime 
                                 - between 
                                 - within 
 
Total= 47,283 
n=17 
T-bar= 2,781.35 
 
 
0.20 0.40 
0.11 
0.39 
0 
0.06 
-0.23 
1 
0.43 
1.14 
4 
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Appendix 2:  Survey Descriptions World Values Survey 
 
World Values Survey and European Values Survey (1981-84, 1990-92, 1995-97) 
The Combined World Values Survey is produced by the Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI, USA. 
The series is designed to enable a cross-national comparison of values and norms on a wide variety of norms 
and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe. Both national random and quota sampling 
were used. All of the surveys were carried out through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe 
consisting of all adult citizens, aged 18 and older, across over 60 nations around the world. The 1981-83 
survey covered 22 independent countries; the 1990-93 survey covered 42 independent countries; the 1995-97 
survey covered 53 independent countries. In total, 64 independent countries have been surveyed in at least 
one wave of this investigation (counting East Germany as an independent country, which it was when first 
surveyed). These countries include almost 80 percent of the world’s population. A fourth wave of surveys is 
being carried out in 1999-2000. The full set of countries covered is: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Czech Republic, East and Unified Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Spain, 
Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Georgia, Ghana, Croatia, Hungary, India, Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Madagascar, Mexico, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Portugal, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States of America, Venezuela, South 
Africa, Moscow, Tambov oblast, Montenegro, Spain, Nigeria, Romania, Moldova and Serbia. 
 
Income Ia: The respondents declared income level as capture in the question “People sometimes describe 
themselves as belonging to the lower class, the middle class, or the upper. How would you describe 
yourself?” 
 
Right Wing-R: is a categorical variable that is the answer to the question: “In politics people talk of the “left” 
and of the “right”. In a scale where “0” is left and “10” is right, where would you place yourself?”.  
 
Unfair for Poor-L: A dummy that is the response to the question: “Why, in your opinion, are there people in 
this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which comes closest to your view?  (1) They are 
poor because of laziness and lack of willpower, or (2) They are poor because society treats them 
unfairly.” The dummy takes the value 1 if the answer is (2) and 0 if the answer is (1). 
 
No Escape–L: A dummy equal to 1 if the answer to the question: “In your opinion, do most poor people in 
this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there is very little chance of escaping?  (1) 
They have a chance or (2) There is very little chance.” was category (2) and 0 if it was category (1). 
 
Government help Poor–L: The response to the World Values question: “Do you think that what the government 
is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little? (1) 
Too much, (2) About the right amount, or (3) Too little.”. Government help Poor–L is a categorical 
variable equal 1 if the answer is (1), 2 if the answer is (2) and 3 if the answer is (3). 
 
Business Ownership-L: The response to the World Values question: “There is a lot of discussion about how 
business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements comes closest to your 
opinion? (1) The owners should run their business or appoint the managers, (2) The owners and the 
employees should participate in the selection of managers, (3) The government should be the owner 
and appoint the managers, (4) The employees should own the business and elect the managers”. 
Business Ownership-L was defined as a dummy equals 1 if the answer is category (3) or (4) and 0 if the 
answer is category (1) or (2). 
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Fair Pay-L: The response to the World Values question: “Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing 
practically the same job. One finds out that the other earns considerably more than she does. The 
better paid secretary, however, is quicker, more efficient and more reliable at her job. In your opinion, 
is it fair or not fair that one secretary is paid more than the other? (1) Fair or (2) Not fair.”. Fair Pay-R 
was defined as a dummy equals 1 if the answer is category (2) and 0 if the answer is category (1). 
 
 
Appendix 2 ( cont inued) :  Latinobarometro 
 
The Latinobarometro Survey, an annual public opinion survey of approximately 19,000 interviews in 18 
countries in Latin America. Questions of interest rotate, so the number of waves (and thus our sample size) 
varies considerably depending on the question being studied. It is produced by Latinobarómetro Corporation, 
a non profit NGO based in Santiago, Chile. It surveys development of democracies, economies and societies 
and we are particularly interested in a number of attitudinal variables that are associated with ideological 
standing (on an economic dimension). Just like the WVS, it is designed to enable a cross-national comparison 
of values and norms on a variety of topics. As far as we can tell, a national random sampling were used, and 
the surveys were carried out through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe consisting of adult 
citizens, aged 18 and older. The countries covered are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela and Spain. 
 
 
Perception of Crime is a dummy that equals 0 if the answer to the question “Crime has increased or decreased?” 
is “Has increased a lot” and 1 if it is “Has increased a little”, “Has stayed the same”, “Has fallen 
a little” or “Has fallen a lot”.  
 
Real Crime is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the answer to the question: “Have you or a relative of yours 
been a victim of an assault, an aggression, or a crime, in the last 12 months?” is “Yes”, and 2 if the 
answer is “No”. 
 
Perception of Corruption is a categorical variable equal 1 if the answer to the question “Corruption has increased 
or decreased?” is “Has increased a lot”, 2 if it is “Has increased a little”, 3 if it is “Has stayed the 
same”, 4 if it is “Has fallen a little” and 5 if it is “Has fallen a lot”. 
 
Real Corruption is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the answer to the question: “Have you or a relative of 
yours been a victim of corruption, in the last 12 months?” is “Yes”, and 2 if the answer is “No”. 
 
Right Wing, is the answer to the question: “In politics people talk of the “left” and of the “right”. In a scale 
where “0” is left and “10” is right, where would you place yourself?”.  
 
Fair-L: Now I'd like you some questions about the problem of poverty, in this country and in other countries: 
How fair do you think the distribution of income is in this country? The four possible answers are 1. 
Very fair; 2. Fair; 3. Unfair; and 4. Very unfair. 
 
Privatiz-L: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Privatization of public companies has 
been beneficial to the country. The two possible answers are 1. I agree; and 2. I disagree.  
 
Age: The respondent’s age, in years.  
 
Gender: The respondent’s gender.  
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Income Ib: The respondents declared income level as capture in the question “The wage or salary you receive 
and the total family income, Does it allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? In which of these 
situations are you?” The possible answers are “It is good enough, you can save”, “It is just enough, 
without great difficulties”, “It is not enough, you have difficulties” and “It is not enough, you have 
great difficulties”. 
 
City Size: The size of the city where the interview takes place. The 2 possible categories are 1 if “100,000 or 
less” and 2 if “capital or more than 100,000”.  
 
 
Appendix 2 ( cont inued) :  World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
 
WDI Online is a data source on the global economy. It contains statistical data for over 600 development 
indicators and time series data from 1960-2004 (selected data for 2005) for over 200 countries and 18 country 
groups. Data includes social, economic, financial, natural resources, and environmental indicators. 
 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %): Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and 
services. In general, a Laspeyres index formula is used. 
 
GDP growth (annual %): Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant U.S. dollars. GDP measures the total output of goods and services 
for final use occurring within the domestic territory of a given country, regardless of the allocation to 
domestic and foreign claims. Gross domestic product at purchaser values (market prices) is the sum 
of gross value added by all resident and nonresident producers in the economy plus any taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
 
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, annual average): Official exchange rate refers to the actual, principal exchange 
rate and is an annual average based on monthly averages (local currency units relative to U.S. dollars) 
determined by country authorities or on rates determined largely by market forces in the legally 
sanctioned exchange market. 
 
Unemployment Total (% of total labor force): Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force without work but 
available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and unemployment differ by 
country. 
 
History of Inflation Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the Inflation (consumer prices) 1993-1997 (5 
years before the 3rd wave of the WVS) using annual averages in %.  
 
History of Growth Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the GDP growth 1993-1997 (5 years before the 3rd 
wave of the WVS) using annual averages in %.  
 
History of Exchange Rate Volatility: Average of the absolute value of the official exchange rate growth 1993-1997 
(5 years before the 3rd wave of the WVS) calculated using the official exchange rate (LCU per US$, 
annual average) 
 
History of Unemployment: Average of the absolute value of Unemployment Total (% of total labor force) 1993-
1997 (5 years before the 3rd wave of the WVS) using annual averages. 
 
Fuel Exports: Refers to Fuel exports as % of merchandise exports. Fuels comprise SITC revision 1, section 3 
(mineral fuels). 
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Ores Exports: Refers to ores and metals exports as % of merchandise exports. Ores and metals comprise 
commodities in SITC revision 1, sections 27 (crude fertilizer, minerals nes); 28 (metalliferous ores, 
scrap; and 68 non-ferrous metals). 
 
Manufacturing Exports: Refers to Manufactures exports as % of merchandise exports. Manufactures comprise 
commodities in SITC revision 1, sections 5 through 9 (chemicals and related products, basic 
manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, other manufactured articles and goods not 
elsewhere classified) excluding division 68 (non-f errous metals). 
 
Merchandise exports show the f.o.b. value of goods provided to the rest of the world valued in U.S. dollars. They 
are classified using the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). In particular, the World 
Bank figures distinguish between "Merchandise Exports" (Exports of things that you can touch) and 
“Exports of Services”, like shipping, tourism, and communications 
 
 
Corruption: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index has been produced annually since 
1982 by Political Risk Services, a private international investment risk service. It is measured on a 0 to 
6 scale. The index is based on the opinion of experts, and intends to capture the extent to which 
“high government officials are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally 
expected throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with import and 
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans”. 
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